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2Do Workers Enjoy Procedural Utility?
1 Introduction
People are likely to obtain utility not only from actual outcomes, but also from the conditions
which lead to these outcomes. This procedural utility is quite a different source of an
individual’s well-being than instrumental outcomes, such as those included in a traditional
utility function in economics. While outcomes are important, the notion that people can have
preferences about how outcomes are generated points to noninstrumental sources of utility
and driving forces behind individual behavior. Procedural utility is likely to be important in
many areas and in different forms although it is largely ignored in economic concepts of
utility. In this paper, we focus on work relationships, and empirically investigate whether
workers enjoy procedural utility.
Work relationships are a setting where the existence of procedural utility seems obvious. For
example, it is very plausible that workers enjoy some procedural utility from how they are
treated by superiors and management, irrespective of the outcomes thereby produced. A
dismissal or a promotion decision is likely to be judged differently by workers depending on
whether they see the process leading to the decision as acceptable or not. Proponents of
‘industrial democracy‘ in economics or of the ‘human relations movement‘ in management
have long been arguing that how workers are treated, e.g. whether they are given a say in
decisions concerning the workplace, has some value in itself. It is thus not only the
instrumental aspects of work that matter (e.g., the pay workers get for a given work input), but
also how these outcomes at work are determined. Although this view has received
considerable attention, the underlying assumption that workers gain procedural utility has
hardly been studied empirically.
In order to identify procedural utility, we focus on a specific, but important, aspect of work
life: the utility workers derive from their pay. Utility from pay is well suited to distinguish
outcome and process utility, because it is relatively straightforward to define and measure
outcome utility in this context. On an individual basis, outcome utility is derived from the pay
level a worker gets for a given work input (job carried out, hours worked, overtime,
education, tenure, etc.): the higher the pay levels ceteris paribus, the higher outcome utility.
The relevant variables are regularly collected in labour force surveys and thus allow assessing
3outcome utility. To identify procedural utility, we test whether workers enjoy utility stemming
from the processes by which pay is determined over and above outcome utility. We find
substantial evidence that workers experience procedural utility from being regularly given the
opportunity to express their views on pay issues towards superiors and management.
A crucial question in this context is how utility from pay can be assessed empirically. From a
traditional economic view, utility cannot be measured directly, but has to be inferred from
observed behaviour. Here, we take a different approach. We measure utility from pay directly
by using self reported pay satisfaction measures as a proxy. Although this is not (yet) standard
in economics, satisfaction measures are increasingly accepted as useful proxy measures for
utility (e.g., for accounts of the discussions on life satisfaction as a proxy for individual well-
being, see Frey and Stutzer 2002c and Oswald 1997). As reported satisfaction measures are
based on individuals‘ self-assessments, they can be biased in several ways. We therefore
conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis to take account of such biases and to rule out
alternative explanations.
The traditional way to identify procedural utility would be to consider it as a compensating
wage differential. If workers value processes, they should be prepared to accept a lower wage,
ceteris paribus. However, it is not straightforward to apply the framework of compensating
wage differentials to the study of procedural utility. Even if procedures have the expected
direct effects on utility, this is not necessarily reflected in a corresponding wage differential:
procedures can also exert indirect and countervailing effects on workers’ productivity (e.g. via
changes in work motivation). Studying wage differentials, it is difficult to separate the various
positive and negative effects of procedural differences that are reflected in a net effect on
income. Thus, it seems warranted to take a more direct approach to identify procedural utility
by using pay satisfaction as a proxy for the utility workers derive from their compensation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.1 takes a broad look at procedural utility and
proposes that three varieties of procedural utility relevant for economics can be distinguished.
Section 2.2 introduces measures of reported satisfaction as proxies for utility. Section 2.3 and
2.4 briefly discuss previous work related to procedural utility in work relationships, set out in
what respect our study differs from previous investigations and put forward two hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the data and the operationalisation of the hypotheses. Section 4 contains
the empirical analysis. Section 5 offers conclusions.
42 Procedural Utility in Work Relationships
2.1 The idea of procedural utility in economics
Standard economic theory is based on the simplifying assumption that individuals derive
utility from instrumental outcomes only. In contrast, procedural utility means that people also
value the conditions, which lead to these outcomes. People can have preferences about a
multitude of different conditions or procedures. They may range from basic constitutional
institutions, like the right to participate in democratic decision making, to the structures of
bilateral exchange relationships, or the context in which individual behaviour takes place. We
propose to classify the sources of procedural utility into three broad categories which are
relevant in economic contexts.
 (i) There is procedural utility people get from institutions as such. People have preferences
about how allocative and redistributive decisions are taken. They may, for example,
appreciate the market place for the freedom it provides in individual choice and
democracy for the equality it provides in political decision-making. In an empirical
application, Frey and Stutzer (2002a) study procedural utility that emerges when
individuals are granted the possibility to participate in decision making. They
empirically show that people gain procedural utility from having extended political
participation rights. Procedural utility, in this case, is mediated through institutions of
direct democracy like initiatives and referenda. The utility effects of these institutions
thereby seem not to come so much from people‘s opportunity to impose outcomes closer
to their preferences; much more, individuals seem to value the possibility to participate
per se. Thus, people get utility from living and acting under particular institutions over
and above outcomes.
 (ii) Procedural utility is involved in the interaction between people. On the one hand, people
can get satisfaction from acting in a fair way or by being honest with other people, quite
independent of the outcome.1 On the other hand, people evaluate actions towards them
                                                           
1 In the last few years experimental economics has unambiguously shown that people derive utility from
behaving fairly. Individuals often choose to follow social norms like fairness or reciprocity, although this leads
to inferior economic outcomes for them (see e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000 for an overview of the experimental
literature).
5not only by their consequences but also by the intentions behind these actions.2 An
individual is, for example, emotionally affected in a negative way by an action when he
or she attributes the actor with a criminal motive rather than a neutral motive.3 How
people perceive a particular treatment, for example by a member of the public
administration or by their superiors at work, is, of course, often also depending on the
institutional setting.
 (iii) Procedural utility can be observed when people undertake an activity for its own sake,
i.e. when they have an intrinsic attitude towards the action or choice process they are
involved in. Some people, for example, just like the activity of gardening, although the
output they thereby produce is instrumentally inferior (they could get the same products
cheaper and possibly of higher quality on the market). A theoretical literature reflects
economists’ interest in this kind of procedural utility. In particular, it has been useful to
model a specific utility for gambling (see Le Menestrel 2001). Pascal (1670) was well
aware of the fact that people derive utility from the mere act of engaging in an activity
such as gambling, and so were Marschak (1950) and von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953).4 The intrinsic value of tasks may again not be independent of the institutional
environment. If, for instance, the institutional context guarantees autonomy, people may
enjoy a task more.
Procedures as a source of individual utility cannot easily be integrated into traditional
economic theory, even if they are themselves reflected in behaviour. This is because the
traditional framework excludes non-instrumental concerns when analysing people’s choices.5
The idea of procedural utility thus goes beyond the narrow consequentialism of standard
economics. This makes it vulnerable to the accusation of being tautological: ex post, every
situation can be redefined to involve ‘procedural goods’ in order to explain puzzling
                                                           
2 Economic models of behaviour that include the underlying motivation of people are for example Falk and
Fischbacher (2000) and Rabin (1993). In a series of experiments, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) find that
individuals value how they are treated by other persons. People seem to experience lower utility when they are
treated intentionally badly, even if economic outcomes are the same.
3 Rabin (2002) emphasises the need for an extended utility concept if these aspects of individual interaction
beyond narrow outcome oriented self-interest are to be integrated in welfare analysis: “[...] players in games
behave systematically differently as a function of previous behaviour by other players. This shows that people
care not only about outcomes, but also how they arrived at those outcomes. The fact that preferences cannot be
defined solely on outcomes can be reconciled with preference theory, but requires an expansion of the notion of
what enters the utility function” (p. 15).
4 There are two strands of literature in empirical economic research that deal with an object very much related to
procedural utility of this third type: the first is compensation differentials in wage rates reflecting the
nonmonetary benefits of work (e.g. Rosen 1986, Viscusi 1993), and the second is process benefits in studies on
the use of time (e.g. Juster and Stafford 1985).
6behaviour. However, this objection also applies to traditional economics to the extent that
every observed change in behaviour is assumed to reflect changes in relative (opportunity)
costs or prices (Becker 1976). In order to be a fruitful concept that makes testable predictions,
it is necessary (i) to specify conditions under which procedural utility is expected to be higher
(or lower) than otherwise and (ii) to have a proxy measure for utility.
2.2 Measuring utility
With respect to measuring utility, economics has experienced a change in recent years. Utility
is increasingly seen as directly measurable by using self-reported satisfaction measures as a
proxy. Measures of subjective well-being (or happiness) have been successfully applied in
economic research e.g. by Clark and Oswald (1994), Di Tella et al. (2001), Easterlin (2001),
Frey and Stutzer (2000) and Kahneman et al. (1997) (for surveys see Frey and Stutzer
2002b,c and Oswald 1997). 6 The existing state of research suggests that measures of reported
satisfaction are a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility (Frey and Stutzer
2002c). It is thus possible to study procedural effects on individual well-being directly, which
makes the notion of procedural utility empirically tractable. Here, we propose that self-
reported pay satisfaction can serve as an indicator for the utility people derive from their pay.
2.3 Related research for work organisations
With respect to theoretical underpinnings, the study of procedural utility can be informed by
several strands of literature.
The concept of procedural utility is related to research on fairness in economics and in other
social sciences. In field, experiment and survey studies, it has been shown that pro-social
preferences influence market behaviour (for the labour market, see e.g. Bewley 1999, Fehr
and Schmidt 2002 and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986). People are for instance willing
to bear the costs of taking revenge if they perceive themselves to be treated in an unfair
manner. Thereby, perceived fairness can depend strongly on the applied procedures for
decision-making. However, in most of the previous research, concerns for procedural fairness
or justice have been seen as almost exclusively instrumental, i.e. people have preferences for
fair procedures because they expect desirable outcomes (Thibaut and Walker 1975).
                                                                                                                                                                                       
5 This is actually done for good reasons; otherwise, the standard expected utility model could not be applied
(Harsanyi 1993).
6 In labor economics, satisfaction measures were first used by Hamermesh (1977) in a paper on economic
determinants of job satisfaction.
7Theories of procedural fairness, in which an intrinsic value is attributed to the process itself,
have mostly been advanced by psychologists (see e.g. Lind and Tyler 1988). Several theories
in psychology can provide a psychological underpinning of procedural utility in the work
setting and in general. In the group-value or relational model of Lind and Tyler (1988),
procedural utility emerges because fair procedures build group solidarity and strengthen the
members’ good standing in a group. Accordingly, people join groups not only for
instrumental reasons (attracting economic advantages) but also in order to obtain
psychological rewards associated with group affiliation, which are mainly determined by
procedural factors. In an extension of the model, the value of procedural justice for workers is
tied to intellectual and emotional recognition by superiors (Kim and Mauborgne 1998). In
self-determination theory the latter ideas are captured in the notions of relatedness and
competence. The theory says that participation and autonomy in decision-making provide
procedural goods that serve innate needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness and thus
contribute to individual well-being, irrespective of instrumental outcomes (Deci and Ryan
2000).
In sum, psychological theories suggest that procedures are evaluated by the relational
information that they convey, such as assessments of impartiality, trustworthiness of superiors
and authorities, the extent to which individuals feel they are treated with dignity, and the
extent to which individuals are given voice (e.g. Lane 1988, Tyler et al. 1997, Tyler and
Blader 2000). This allows to derive hypotheses under which conditions procedural utility is
expected to be higher (lower). Previous research on work organisations has thereby not so
much focused on objective differences between procedures, but has mainly relied on
subjective fairness evaluations of the procedures applied e.g. at a workplace. Justice
perceptions in the work realm have so far been linked to work performance, organisational
citizenship behaviour, counterproductive work behaviour, withdrawal behaviour and
organisational commitment (see recent contributions in Greenberg and Cropanzano 2001 and
Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001 for a meta-analysis). Procedural utility can be seen as the
attitudinal counterpart to these behavioural responses that is reflected – loosely speaking – in
workers ‘satisfaction’.
2.4 An application: procedural utility from pay procedures
In this study, we try to identify procedural utility directly by studying the effects of pay
procedures on utility from pay. Pay is a well suited subject of study, because it constitutes an
8important outcome for workers with respect to their job. In a purely instrumental view, pay is
the only outcome of interest, because every aspect of a job or work relation is evaluated with
respect to the pay it generates for an employee. Moreover, the pay level a worker gets for a
given work input is commonly understood as the source of outcome utility in this context. It is
essential that outcome utility is properly controlled for when assessing procedural effects. It
has to be ruled out that procedures are only valued by workers because they generate better
outcomes for them.
Pay procedures determine how firms set, adjust, administer and communicate individual
employees’ compensation for their engagement in the job. They reflect an important aspect of
a firm’s ‘constitution’ and employees may gain procedural utility from these institutions that
form the pay process as such. Moreover, pay procedures form the interaction between
superiors and subordinates in questions of compensation. They may have a substantial effect
on how employees feel that they are treated. A major characteristic of procedures that are
perceived as fair is the admission of voice to both sides (see section 2.3). Differences in voice
convey important relational information, which is expected to result in differences in
procedural utility. Thus, we advance Hypothesis I:
The more frequently employees have the possibility of voice in the pay process the
more procedural utility they gain over and above the outcome utility from their
compensation.
In hypothesis I, the determinants of outcome and process utility are assumed to be
independent. However, evidence suggests that process judgements interact with the perceived
favourability of outcomes (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996). In particular, when an outcome is
not personally beneficial, individuals tend to experience low outcome satisfaction, unless the
procedure is perceived as fair. Thus, procedural utility is expected to be higher for relatively
bad outcomes, ceteris paribus. In the present setting, the prediction is not so straightforward.
The perceived fairness of pay procedures is not directly connected with the procedures that
determine employees’ output and that are themselves the basis for their pay. Nevertheless,
following the basic idea of interaction, we formulate hypothesis II:
The less favourable the outcome of the pay process, the more the possibility of voice in
the pay process is contributing to procedural utility.
In order to test these hypotheses empirically, we use satisfaction with pay as a domain
specific proxy measure for utility. Pay satisfaction is a very well established measure for
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1992). There is also substantial previous research that has studied the effects of participation
on pay satisfaction (starting with Lawler 1976). However, the observed relationships between
work place institutions and pay satisfaction have hardly been analysed on systematic
differences between instrumental and non-instrumental aspects. The studies most closely
related to ours (Martin and Bennett 1996, Tremblay et al. 2000) have studied how reported
perceived fairness of pay procedures correlates with pay satisfaction. In contrast to this work,
the present study does not refer to proxy measures of perceived fairness. Instead, institutional
variation in pay procedures as such is analysed empirically. Compared to most of the previous
research on pay satisfaction or on procedural justice, we can rely on a large and representative
data set. Moreover, the survey design allows for the rigorous controlling of confounding
outcome effects and testing of various alternative explanations.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS,
Department of Trade and Industry 1999), which can be considered to be the most
authoritative source of information on employee relations in Great Britain. In the WERS, a
nationally representative sample of over 28,000 British employees working in 2,200 different
firms participated in a anonymous self-completion survey about their workplace.7 Apart from
being a large scale, representative survey, the WERS is especially suited for the empirical
analysis because it contains some unique questions that allow identifying process and
outcome utility at the individual level.
As the dependent variable, we use pay satisfaction as a proxy for the utility workers derive
from their compensation. Whereas other large worker surveys only assess general work
satisfaction (if at all), the WERS assesses satisfaction separately in different dimensions. With
respect to compensation, workers had to answer the following question: “How satisfied are
you with the following aspects of your job? [...] The amount of pay you receive.” Answers
were coded on a five point scale ranging from “1=very satisfied”, “2=satisfied”, “3=neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied”, “4=dissatisfied” to “5=very dissatisfied”. We recode answers so
that the highest satisfaction score of 5 means “very satisfied” and the lowest score of 1 means
                                                           
7 As there is a considerable number of missing values, we are left with a final data set of 22,622 employees
working in 1,774 different firms for which all required information is available.
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“very dissatisfied”.8 A look at descriptive statistics shows that British workers are only
moderately satisfied with their pay on average. The people included in our final sample
indicate a mean pay satisfaction value of 2.83, which is just below the category “neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied”. There is substantial variation in pay satisfaction (st.d. = 1.10),
indicating that British workers differ considerably in the utility they derive from their pay.
The main aspect of our empirical investigation is to disentangle outcome and process effects
on pay satisfaction. Thereby, a worker’s wage – while controlling for a wide range of work
inputs - is applied as determinant of outcome utility. The higher a worker’s wage is for the
same work input, the higher is outcome utility expected to be. In the WERS, workers’ pay
levels are assessed using twelve wage categories.9 As these categories are relatively broad, we
apply two different approaches to identify outcome utility. First, we compute an hourly wage
rate for each worker by taking the mean wage of the wage category a worker is in and
dividing it by the regular and overtime hours a worker regularly works.10 This results in a
much more refined picture of individual wages: the resulting hourly wage rate variable
contains not just 13, but 1320 different categories. As a second strategy, the twelve wage
categories in the WERS are included directly as dummy variables (while correcting for hours
and overtime hours worked). A categorised variable can indicate, for example, nonlinearities
in the relationship between wage and outcome utility that the first variable cannot account for.
Both earnings variables will only adequately reflect outcome utility, however, if work inputs
are held constant. The WERS contains information on the following work characteristics:
tenure (5 categories), type of contract (3 categories), age (7 categories), highest educational
qualification (6 categories), job carried out (9 categories), industry (12 categories),
establishment size (5 categories), marital status (4 categories), race (9 categories), gender and
                                                           
8 The other areas where satisfaction was assessed included “the amount of influence you have over your job”,
“the sense of achievement you get from your work” and “the respect you get from supervisors”. These
dimensions were coded equally and are used later in the sensitivity analysis section.
9 The exact question is “How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other deductions are taken
out?“ The categories are “less than £2,600 per year“, “£2,601-£4,160 per year“, “£4,161-£7,280 per year“,
“£7,281-£9,630 per year“, “£9,631-£11,440 per year“, “£11,441-£13,520 per year“, “£13,521-£16,120 per year“,
“£16,121-£18,720 per year“, “£18,721-£22,360 per year“, “£22,361-£28,080 per year“, “£28,081-£35,360 per
year“, “£35,361 or more per year“.
10 Specifically, we divided average weekly earnings by the average hours worked each week. Thereby, average
overtime hours worked reported by the workers were weighted by a factor 1.5, but only if workers indicated that
they were paid extra for the overtime hours (in Britain, paid overtime hours have to be compensated by a factor
of 1.5 of normal hourly wages). If workers indicated that they were sometimes compensated for overtime hours
and sometimes could take off later, we weighted overtime hours by a factor 1.25. For the top wage category a
mean wage of £765/week (£39,780/year) is assumed. The resulting variable has a mean of £7.64 (st.d. £6.42),
and its natural logarithm a mean of 1.89 (st.d. 0.50).
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the existence of a union at the establishment. These variables are included as control variables
to correct outcome utility estimates for differences in work inputs between workers.
In order to identify procedural utility, the WERS offers a unique variable that captures
specifically how pay is handled at a workplace. Workers were asked: “How often are you and
others working here asked by managers about your views on the following: […] Pay
issues?”11 Answers were coded on a four point scale including “frequently”, “sometimes”,
“hardly ever” and “never”. Again, we recode answers so that the procedural variable takes on
the highest value (equal to 4) when workers are asked frequently about their views on pay
issues, and the lowest (equal to 1) when this is never the case. The resulting variable is well
suited to study procedural utility, because it captures two conditions, which we have
connected to procedural utility. On the one hand, the variable contains the notion of
participation possibilities. The more workers are given the possibility to express their views
on pay issues, the higher is their potential say in decisions concerning this important aspect of
work. On the other hand, the frequency of being asked on pay issues gives an indication of
how workers are treated by their superiors and management with respect to pay
determination. So workers may gain procedural utility from the institution as such as well as
from the quality of interaction. The descriptive statistics show that on average, British
workers are not given much opportunities for voice. The mean value in the sample is 1.84,
indicating that workers are on average “hardly ever” consulted on pay issues. However, there
is substantial variation (st.d. 0.95) that can be exploited in the empirical analysis.
In our view, the data and variables used have several advantages compared to related research
on work relationships. First, the WERS is to our knowledge the only large scale,
representative employee survey that asks workers in such a precise and specific way to give
information on the procedures surrounding pay determination. This is important, because
most previous research has been done with nonrepresentative and rather small samples of
employees working in a small number of firms (for a survey see Tyler and Blader 2000).
While this research has greatly advanced the understanding of the detailed psychological
mechanisms that lead to procedural fairness perceptions, it is important whether procedural
utility is a representative phenomenon relevant for a broad class of workers, irrespective of
job, industry, or the size of the firm they work in. Second, the process variable is captured
‘plain’, i.e. without an assessment of perceived fairness. This reduces biases due to reverse
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causation.12 Third, the survey design allows for the rigorous controlling of outcome utility
because, along with wage rates, it also contains essential work input variables.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Basic regression for procedural utility
In table 1, we present the results for the ‘basic’ regression that includes all the main
explanatory and control variables presented in the last section. As pay satisfaction is ordinally
scaled, a weighted ordered probit model is used in order to exploit the ranking information
contained in the dependent variable. The weighting variable that is applied allows
representative results on the subject level for Britain. Moreover, the estimated standard errors
are adjusted to clustering of observations at the firm level. This is necessary because firms
have been the primary sampling units and thus observations may not be independent within
firms. The workers in our data set work in 1,774 different firms.
The results in table 1 indicate that there are significant outcome and procedural effects on the
utility workers derive from their pay. The results can be interpreted as follows: A positive
coefficient indicates that the probability of being more satisfied with pay increases, compared
to any given level. The marginal effect indicates the change of the probability that an
individual is more satisfied with pay by one point when the independent variable increases by
one unit. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as an increase in the share of persons that derive a
certain level of utility from pay. In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is
evaluated with respect to the reference group. The marginal effects provided indicate the
average probability change over all the five scores of the pay satisfaction variable.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
11 There were four other areas for which workers had to state how often they were asked by management for
their views: “Future plans for the workplace“, “Staffing issues“, “Changes to work practices“, “Health and safety
at work“. These variables are used in the sensitivity analysis section.
12 The possibility of reverse causation is discussed and empirically tested in section 4.3.
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Table 1: Procedural Utility from Pay Procedures
Dependent variable: pay satisfaction
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering
at the firm level
Variable Coefficient z-value Marginal effect
(average for
all scores)
(1) Procedural factor
Frequency of being asked on pay issues 0.202** 17.170 0.031
(2) Outcome factor
Log(hourly wage) 0.712** 16.049 0.108
(3) Variables controlling for work inputs
Tenure
less than 1 year Reference group
1 to less than 2 years -0.121** -3.719 -0.018
2 to less than 5 years -0.149** -4.264 -0.023
5 to less than 10 years -0.196** -5.661 -0.030
more than 10 years -0.308** -8.734 -0.048
Age
less than 20 Reference group
20-24 -0.263** -3.903 -0.041
25-29 -0.340** -5.153 -0.053
30-39 -0.299** -4.640 -0.046
40-49 -0.240** -3.627 -0.037
50-59 -0.249** -3.612 -0.039
60 or more 0.098 1.211 0.015
Type of contract
permanent Reference group
temporary 0.147** 2.631 0.022
fixed-term 0.028 0.519 0.004
Education
CSE or equivalent Reference group
O level or equivalent -0.081* -2.121 0.012
A level or equivalent -0.159** -4.287 0.024
Degree or equivalent -0.264** -5.608 0.041
Postgraduate degree or equivalent -0.278** -4.893 0.043
No of the education levels mentioned 0.005 0.145 0.001
Job carried out
Manager & senior administrator Reference group
Professional -0.236** -5.495 0.037
Associate professional & technical -0.279** -5.757 0.043
Clerical & secretarial -0.177** -3.942 0.027
Craft & skilled service -0.352** -6.576 0.055
Personal & protective service -0.092 -1.554 0.014
Sales 0.073 1.182 0.011
Operative & assembly -0.148* -2.174 0.023
Other occupation 0.018 0.293 0.002
No union at workplace Reference group
Union at workplace -0.010 0.387 -0.001
Industry
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Manufacturing Reference group
Electricity, gas and water 0.244** 3.870 0.037
Construction -0.019 -0.339 -0.002
Wholesale and retail 0.006 0.135 0.001
Hotels and restaurants -0.039 -0.526 -0.006
Transport and communication -0.204** -3.586 -0.032
Financial services -0.045 -0.727 -0.007
Other business services -0.132* -2.446 -0.020
Public administration -0.144* -2.406 -0.022
Education -0.115* -2.181 -0.018
Health -0.220** -3.463 -0.034
Other community services -0.202** -3.225 -0.031
Establishment size
Less than 25 employees Reference group
25-49 employees -0.044 -1.610 0.006
50-99 employees -0.034 -1.225 -0.005
100-199 employees -0.028 -1.003 0.004
200-499 employees -0.080** -2.968 -0.012
500 or more employees 0.003 0.123 -0.001
(4) Socio-demographic variables
Male Reference group
Female 0.332** 5.443 0.051
Marital Status
Single Reference group
Living with spouse or partner 0.015 0.527 0.002
Divorced/separated -0.043 -0.872 -0.006
Widowed 0.063 0.668 0.009
Race
White Reference group
Black Caribbean -0.384* -2.440 -0.060
Black African -0.258 -1.651 -0.040
Black other -0.457* -2.442 -0.072
Indian -0.154 -1.383 -0.024
Pakistani 0.128 0.880 0.019
Bangladeshi -0.277 -1.324 -0.043
Chinese -0.219 -0.931 -0.034
Other ethnic group -0.120 -1.407 -0.018
Observations 22,622
Number of firms (sampling units) 1,774
F (56, 1718) 25.43**
Log likelihood -30931.497
Pseudo R2 0.05
Notes: Pay satisfaction is measured on a five point scale. White estimator for variance.
Significance levels: (*) 0.05 < p < 0.10, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: WERS 1998.
As a main result, we find that workers report higher satisfaction with pay when they are asked
on pay issues by their superiors, ceteris paribus. A one point increase in the procedural factor
‘frequency of being asked on pay issues’ raises the probability of a person being one point
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more satisfied with pay by 3.1 percentage points. The effect is sizeable and statistically highly
significant. When the full range of the procedural variable is considered, i.e. when individuals
who are never asked on pay issues are compared to workers who are frequently asked, the
marginal effect amounts to 9.3 percentage points. This means, for example, that workers who
are regularly given the opportunity to express their views on pay issues towards superiors and
management are about 9 percent more likely to be very satisfied with pay than workers who
never have this opportunity. This evidence lends support to hypothesis I that workers gain
procedural utility from having the possibility of voice in pay issues.
The procedural effect exists over and above an outcome effect. The outcome factor is itself an
statistically highly significant predictor of pay satisfaction. A shift in the log hourly wage by
one standard deviation (0.5 points) changes a worker’s pay satisfaction by 5.4 percentage
points; in other words, a one st.d. higher pay level (approx. an increase of £4 from £6.5 to
£10.5) leads ceteris paribus to a 5.4 percent higher outcome utility.13 This evidence supports
the traditional economic view that outcomes provide utility. However, the size of the effect is
relatively small.
The estimation results furthermore indicate that it is important to include control variables
when assessing procedural and outcome utility in work relationships. Most of the work input
and socio-demographic variables exert statistically significant effects on pay satisfaction, and
the estimated signs can be plausibly interpreted. For example, it seems natural that workers
with higher tenure are less satisfied with their pay given that they get the same pay as
otherwise similar colleagues with lower tenure. Along the same lines, the negative effects
estimated for higher age and higher education, and the positive effects for temporary workers
can be explained. Satisfaction with pay is estimated to be u-shaped in age, indicating that
workers are least satisfied with their pay ceteris paribus at ages 25-39. satisfaction is more or
less linearly decreasing in education if wage levels and other work inputs are held constant.
An interpretation of this may be that income aspirations are increasing in education and that
the negative effects reflect the discrepancy between actual pay and aspiration level.
Temporary workers are found to be more satisfied with their pay ceteris paribus than workers
with permanent contracts. Whereas these previous results are plausible, it seems difficult to
explain why some profession groups are less satisfied with their pay ceteris paribus than the
higher ranking reference group of managers, and why workers belonging to some non-white
                                                           
13 The effects are computed using coefficients from a regression identical to the basic regression in table 1, but
instead of ordered probit estimator the OLS method was applied (OLS regression not shown).
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races are less satisfied than white workers ceteris paribus (i.e. getting the same pay level).
Especially in the latter case, there might be idiosyncratic reasons at work why workers are
less satisfied with their pay, e.g. cultural differences.
4.2 Absolute pay, relative pay, and the interaction between procedural utility and
outcome favourability
In the basic regression, outcome utility is measured using the variable ‘hourly wage’ while
controlling for work inputs. One might argue that this variable does not correctly measure
outcome utility, because individuals might only care for the absolute level of their pay and
disregard work inputs. Indeed, the outcome variable applied can be interpreted as a measure
of relative income: as the regression controls for input characteristics, an employee’s wage
level is already indicating her income position relative to similar workers. In order to
investigate whether such differences in the definition of outcome utility affect the results, we
first estimate a regression that only includes the absolute hourly wage level and the procedural
variable, while disregarding all other work input variables that are included in the basic
regression. The results are presented in panel A in table 2. They show that the coefficient of
the procedural variable is basically unchanged, while also an outcome utility effect from
absolute wage levels is found. Second, a wage function is estimated that includes all the
factors included in table 1 (except the procedural variable). From the wage function, we
calculate for each worker her positive or negative wage premium relative to equally
characterised workers. Panel B of table 2 shows the estimation results when individual wage
differentials are included in the regression, together with the absolute wage level and the
procedural factor. The results indicate that relative wages exert a positive effect on workers
pay satisfaction, and that the absolute wage levels become relatively unimportant. This
corroborates previous findings that relative income matters for satisfaction on the job (Clark
and Oswald 1996). Moreover, the procedural effect is only minimally affected by this change
in specification.
In hypothesis II, it is argued that workers’ experience of procedural utility cannot be
considered independent of the outcome of the process: The characteristics of the process
matter more in case of an unfavourable outcome. This proposition can be empirically tested
with an interaction term that combines the procedural factor with the outcome variable
([frequency of being asked on pay issues]*[relative wage level]). The results are presented in
panel C in table 2. We find that the procedural factor is not significantly more important when
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relative outcomes are unfavourable. There seems to be no sizeable systematic difference in
the procedural utility employees can gain from having a say in pay issues, depending on the
favourability of the outcome. Thus the empirical evidence does not support hypothesis II. An
explanation could be that processes and outcomes interact in a more complex way than
assumed in hypothesis II. For example, while a procedure that is perceived as fair may be
more valuable as such when the outcome is not beneficial for oneself, it may also reduce self-
esteem more because an unfavourable outcome is more attributed to oneself (Schroth and
Shah 2000).
Table 2: Absolute Pay, Relative Pay, and the Interaction between
Procedural Utility and Outcome Favourability
Dependent variable: pay satisfaction
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering at the firm level
Variable A B C
Procedural factor
Frequency of being asked on payissues 0.205**
(0.011)
0.211**
(0.013)
0.221**
(0.013)
Outcome factors
Absolute Pay Level
(Log(hourly wage))
0.403**
(0.028)
0.122**
(0.034)
0.119**
(0.034)
Relative Pay Level
(Residuals from a wage regression)
0.566**
(0.052)
0.534**
(0.110)
Interaction between process and
outcome
Procedural factor * Relative Pay
Level
0.018
(0.042)
No. of observations 22,622 22,622 22,622
Log likelihood -31753.525 -31514.529 -31514.116
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data source: WERS 1998.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The large and representative survey at hand offers a promising possibility to study outcome
and process utility. It provides measures for workers involvement in pay issues, their wage
and their satisfaction with pay. Still, the variables are based on self-reported measures. Thus,
it is possible that workers give systematically biased answers, or that the variables measure
something else than they are actually intended to measure. In this subsection, such potential
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errors in measurement are explored in some detail. The results of the sensitivity analysis are
summarised in table 3. It is reported how the coefficient on the procedural factor is changed
when alternative specifications are estimated. Panel A in table 3 restates the results for the
basic equation in table 1.
First, the procedural variable ‘frequency of being asked on pay issues’ might not precisely
measure procedures surrounding pay determination if workers have the general relationships
between managers and workers in mind when answering the question. If the atmosphere at
work is good, workers can be expected to be more satisfied with a given pay level, but they
might also be inclined to overstate the frequency of being asked on pay issues just because
general work relations are good. Then, the estimated effect for the procedural factor would
not necessarily reflect procedural utility with respect to pay, but could just reflect better
outcomes in other work areas associated with good work relationships. To address this
problem, a specification is estimated that includes a variable for the general quality of work
relationships (and otherwise the same variables as in the basic regression). Workers were
asked: “In general, how would you describe the relations between managers and employees
here?” Answers were given on a five point scale ranging from ’very good’ (5) to ‘very poor’
(1). The results for the extended specification B in table 3 indicate that indeed part of the
process effect in the estimation is due to such an omitted factor of general work quality. Once
good general relationships between workers and managers are accounted for, the coefficient
on the procedural variable is lowered by about on third of the basic estimate. Nevertheless, it
remains considerable in size and statistically highly significant. General work relationships
are in itself an important predictor of pay satisfaction.
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent variable: pay satisfaction
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering at the firm level
Variable A B C D E
Procedural factor
Frequency of being asked on pay
issues
0.202**
(0.011)
0.140**
(0.012)
0.109**
(0.014)
0.106**
(0.015)
0.107**
(0.014)
Outcome factor
Log(hourly wage) 0.712**
(0.044)
0.714**
(0.042)
0.716**
(0.042)
0.742**
(0.045)
Quality of relations between managers
and employees
0.314**
(0.010)
0.296**
(0.010)
0.134**
(0.013)
0.133**
(0.013)
Involvement in other work areas
Future plans for workplace 0.007
(0.012)
-0.021
(0.013)
-0.022
(0.013)
Staffing issues 0.003
(0.014)
0.007
(0.012)
0.007
(0.013)
Changes to work practices 0.032*
(0.014)
0.009
(0.014)
0.010
(0.015)
Health and safety at work 0.035**
(0.011)
0.015
(0.012)
0.016
(0.012)
Satisfaction with other aspects of job
Amount of influence over job 0.175**
(0.014)
0.174**
(0.014)
Sense of achievement 0.129**
(0.012)
0.133**
(0.012)
Respect from supervisors 0.136**
(0.013)
0.134**
(0.013)
Wage categories
less than £2,600 per year Ref. group
£2,601-£4,160 per year 0.010
£4,161-£7,280 per year 0.265**
£7,281-£9,630 per year 0.290**
£9,631-£11,440 per year 0.384**
£11,441-£13,520 per year 0.599**
£13,521-£16,120 per year 0.793**
£16,121-£18,720 per year 1.004**
£18,721-£22,360 per year 1.287**
£22,361-£28,080 per year 1.418**
£28,081-£35,360 per year 1.699**
£35,361 or more per year 2.096**
Regular weekly hours worked -0.023**
Unpaid weekly overtime hours worked -0.029**
Paid weekly overtime hours worked -0.018**
Control variables for work inputs and
socio-demographic characteristics  Yes 
No. of observations 22,622 22,622 22,353 21,925 21,925
Log likelihood -30931.497 -30014.825 -29605.863 -28222.799 -26972.154
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted ordered probit. They include the same
control variables as in table 1.Significance levels: * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data source: WERS 1998.
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Second, the procedural variable might not measure workers involvement regarding pay issues,
but could just reflect workers involvement in other issues concerning their workplace. As the
interest is in the procedures with respect to pay, this would be a serious mismeasurement. The
survey design allows controlling for this alternative explanation because in the WERS,
workers were asked about their involvement in four important additional work dimensions.
Apart from ‘pay issues’, workers had to answer the question “How often are you and others
working here asked by managers about your views on the following: [...] future plans for the
workplace, staffing issues, changes to work practices and health and safety at work?“14 These
four variables are included in specification C. The results show that the estimate for
procedural utility is thereby changed in the expected direction. The coefficient is lowered by
an additional fifth, being the involvement in the areas ‘change to work practices’ and ‘health
and safety’ those who capture part of the basic procedural utility estimate. Note, however, that
the procedural effect remains statistically highly significant and sizeable. This is remarkable,
because in specification C the procedural variable is very likely to capture nothing else than
the specific effects of being asked on pay issues. This alone seems to have a considerable
effect on pay satisfaction, regardless of any other involvement at the workplace or general
quality of work relationships.
Third, even controlling for the aforementioned measurement issues, there might still be a bias
resulting from omitted characteristics that influence the dependent variable ‘pay satisfaction’
as well as the procedural factor. It could be that people who are by nature more satisfied with
any aspect of their work are inclined to rate also the frequency of being asked on pay issues
more positively. Alternatively, there could be reverse causality: people who are generally
satisfied with their work are simply more frequently asked by their superiors on pay issues,
e.g. because they know that these people are less likely to complain. We address these
problems by including three additional variables in specification D which measure workers’
satisfaction with respect to other work aspects. These are satisfaction with ‘the amount of
influence you have over your job’, ‘the sense of achievement you get from your work’ and
‘the respect you get from supervisors’. Including these variables should lower the estimate for
procedural utility to zero if an omitted personal characteristics bias or reverse causality is
present in the data. However, the effect for procedural utility is hardly changed. The three
additional satisfaction measures are highly correlated with the dependent variable pay
                                                           
14Answers are coded on a four point scale ranging from ‘frequently’ (4), ’sometimes’ (3),‘hardly ever’ (2)
and ’never’ (1).
21
satisfaction, but they seem to capture other aspects determining utility from pay.15 Thus, we
are led to conclude that the procedural factor indeed identifies procedural utility of being
asked about pay issues in workers’ reported satisfaction with pay.
Lastly, we conduct some further sensitivity analysis by using a different approach of
measuring outcome utility. In panel E in table 3, instead of the hourly wages, the twelve wage
categories of the WERS are included as dummy variables, while controlling for average
weekly hours and paid and unpaid overtime hours worked. The results indicate that outcome
utility is a robust phenomenon; moreover, it is strictly increasing in wage rates, which further
indicates that outcome utility is likely to be assessed correctly. The estimate on the procedural
utility variable is not affected by this change in specification.
5 Conclusions
The concept of procedural utility extends the outcome-oriented approach to human well-being
in economics. It proposes that people have preferences about how outcomes are generated.
These preferences about procedures yield themselves procedural utility. In this procedural
approach, people’s concerns about the conditions under which outcomes are generated are not
instrumental in a sense that people expect beneficial outcomes.
In this paper, organisational practices at the workplace are considered a possible source of
procedural utility. Employees may have a preference for institutions that give them a say in
pay issues. They may appreciate the possibility of voice as such as well as the quality of
treatment and communication with superiors it imposes. The proponents of ‘industrial
democracy‘ as well as the ‘human relations movement‘ have long been arguing that how
workers are treated, e.g. whether they are given autonomy and participation possibilities in
decisions concerning their workplace, has some value in itself.
The results of our empirical analysis are consistent with this notion of procedural utility. For a
representative sample of more than 20,000 British workers, we find that being asked on pay
issues contributes to workers’ well-being measured by their satisfaction with pay. This effect
holds over and above the effects of employees’ wage levels and work inputs on pay
                                                           
15 Note that the WERS98 does not include a question on overall job satisfaction that could be included in the
regression. However, including such a variable would not seem appropriate. If an equilibrium approach holds
with respect to job satisfaction (i.e., any satisfaction in a specific area of a job, like pay, is compensated
elsewhere in the job, such that in equilibrium, job satisfaction is equalized across workers cet. par.), then our
procedural effect would by necessity be lowered to zero when an overall job satisfaction variable is included in
the regression. In contrast, the satisfaction measures for other work aspects used can be expected to sufficiently
capture unobserved individual characteristics or reverse causality.
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satisfaction. The effect is also robust to powerful alternative explanations. In the most
conservative estimation we still find a substantial procedural utility effect. If an employee is
‘hardly ever’ asked on pay issues rather than ‘sometimes’ her wage has to be increased by
approximately 15 percent in order to keep her pay satisfaction constant.
We do not find that procedural utility is restricted to employees with an unfavourable
outcome, i.e. a relatively low wage. This evidence thus contradicts the cynical view that
procedural utility is merely used instrumentally by employers to offset poor compensation.
Moreover, the finding makes it difficult to reinterpret procedural utility as false
consciousness.
While the study of pay satisfaction is not the prime goal of the paper, the empirical findings
may also contribute to its understanding. It is shown that organisational practices have a
robust effect on pay satisfaction. Pay satisfaction may be a goal in itself as it contributes to
people’s well-being. Moreover, the relevance of pay satisfaction for pro-social organisational
behaviour is well documented.
Overall, the concept of procedural utility contributes to a better understanding of what
individuals value. We submit that individuals gain utility from procedures over and above the
outcome that is thereby generated. In particular for work relationships, it is shown that
employees’ derive substantial utility from having a say in pay procedures.
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